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Judicial Review: A Wasting Asset
Louis Luskyt
The Supreme Court's power of judicial review is a vital na-
tional resource. It facilitates self-government and enables poten-
tially disaffected minorities to win recognition of their griev-
ances without resort to civil disobedience, rebellion, or other
forms of lawless self-help.1 The power can lose much of its value,
however, if it is persistently over-used.2 In this author's opinion,
it has been persistently over-used in recent years.
In the name of the Constitution, the Court has invalidated a
great many official actions that have not offended prohibitions
specified in the text (or inferable from its structure), on the ba-
sis of new constitutional rules of its own devising. Some of these
innovations are legitimate because they are necessary for satis-
faction of national commitments to self-government and preser-
vation of the open society,3 commitments reflected in the origi-
nal Constitution. More and more such innovations, however, not
being explainable on this basis, outrun the Court's legitimate au-
thority. This Article, without attempting a complete enumera-
tion, examines enough of these innovations to illustrate the
point.
I. The Commitments to Self-Government and the Open
Society
The commitment to self-government is evidenced by the
guarantee to the states of a "Republic Form of Government,""
and by provisions for fairly frequent congressional and presiden-
t Betts Professor of Law Emeritus, Columbia Law School. A.B., University of Lou-
isville, 1935; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1937.
Copyright 0 1987 Louis Lusky All Rights Reserved.
1. L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO
REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 38-39 (1975).
2. Id. at 41.
3. Id. at 21.
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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tial elections.' By providing a channel for peaceable change in
the law, the electoral system helps tame dissatisfaction with ex-
isting conditions which might otherwise erupt in lawless self-
help.'
From its beginning, the nation has been committed not only
to self-government but also to preservation of what is commonly
called the open society - a society in which personal autonomy
can be and is maximized7 because nearly everyone accepts the
law as morally binding on him. That makes possible the mainte-
nance of civil order without coercion through extensive policing.8
The open society is vulnerable to disruption by those who
do not accept the law as binding upon them. A thoroughly disaf-
fected group may be quite small - far too small to mount a
successful rebellion - and still be capable of enough disruption
to force an open society to close.' Even a small band of malcon-
tents, feeling no obligation to comply with the law, can make
people afraid to walk the streets or ply their trade without ex-
tensive police protection. In the interest of public safety, resort
is had to some or all of the trappings of a police state, such as
searches and arrests on mere suspicion, widespread surveillance,
wholesale employment of informers, curfews, and preventive de-
tention.10 The intrusive police measures affect everyone's free-
dom, and the whole society is less open.
In this connection, a special problem exists with respect to
5. Id., art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 1; amend. XII, XVII.
6. See L. LUSKY, supra note 1, at 120-21.
7. U.S. CONST., preamble: "We the People of the United States, in Order to ...
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution .... "
8. Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 3-5 (1942).
9. Lusky, The King Dream: Fantasy or Prophecy?, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1030
(1968).
10. Id. at 1031. For a recent illustration, see United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095
(1987), upholding the preventive detention provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 3141(e) (Supp. III 1985). The statute authorizes denial of bail if necessary to
assure "the safety of any other person and the community." The Court noted that the
statute responded to "the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release
.... .Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2098 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3185). The Court went on to
say: "[Tihe government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate
circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest." Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2102.
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"discrete and insular minorities"1  - members of racial, reli-
gious, or other groups who have reason to fear that their needs
will be discounted in the process of compromise that character-
izes most legislation."2 Such minorities have reason to fear that
the bond of community kinship, which leads legislators to iden-
tify with most of their constituents and take full account of their
needs in fashioning legislation, is attenuated in their case. The
danger is that they will not accept the legislative compromises as
binding on them if they perceive the law to treat them less fa-
vorably than others and, despairing of relief through the politi-
cal process, will be driven toward lawless self-help. The conse-
quent threat to the openness of the society has already been
mentioned.
II. The Legitimacy of Constitutional Innovations
The orthodox conception of judicial review, proclaimed in
Marbury v. Madison," is that it consists of interpreting the text
of the Constitution and invalidating any statute or other official
action that conflicts with the text as so interpreted. For some
time, however, the Supreme Court has been supplementing the
text by proclaiming new constitutional rules.
Not all such innovations should be condemned as usurpa-
tions of authority. Many of them can be defended as legitimate
because necessary for fulfillment of basic national commitments.
For centuries, courts have recognized a principle of interpreta-
tion encapsulated in the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Freely translated, it means "so that the enterprise's
main purpose may succeed rather than fail." This Article will
refer to it simply as "the Maxim." A court resorts to the Maxim
when it has to decide whether and how the decision of a case is
governed by a written instrument of some kind, and the words
of the instrument do not explicitly apply to the factual situation
then before the court. In that event, applying the Maxim, the
court is guided by the purpose or purposes for which the writing
11. The term comes from United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938). See Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM.
L. Rsv. 1093 (1982).
12. See Lusky, supra note 8, at 4.
13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
1987]
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was produced. If it is a contract or a treaty, the court asks what
was the purpose of the parties; if a will, what was the purpose of
the testator; if a statute, what was the purpose of the legislators;
if a constitution, what was the purpose of its framers and
ratifiers?"4
The Maxim has been used in so many legal contexts that it
can fairly be said to pervade the law.15 Perhaps its most familiar
application is the doctrine of cy pres, or equitable approxima-
tion, in the law of charitable trusts. 6 But it also has an estab-
lished place in constitutional law. Judge Learned Hand, in his
1958 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture, after rejecting other
grounds for accepting as legitimate the judicial review of federal
statutes, proceeded to acknowledge its legitmacy in these terms:
For centuries it has been an accepted canon in interpretation
of documents to interpolate into the text such provisions, though
not expressed, as are essential to prevent the defeat of the ven-
ture at hand; and this applies with special force to the interpreta-
tion of constitutions, which, since they are designed to cover a
great multitude of necessarily unforseen occasions, must be cast
in general language, unless they are constantly amended. If so, it
was altogether in keeping with established practice for the Su-
preme Court to assume an authority to keep the states, Congress,
and the President within their prescribed powers. Otherwise the
government could not proceed as planned; and indeed would al-
most certainly have foundered, as in fact it almost did over that
very issue.1 7
14. E.g., Purvis v. United States, 344 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1965) (contract); Zda-
nok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd sub nom. Glidden Co. v. Zda-
nok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (collective bargaining agreement); Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass.
148, 155 (1979) (will); Note, The South West Africa Cases: Ut Res Magis Pereat Quam
Valeat, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1170, 1191 (1967) (treaty).
15. The LEXIS memory bank reveals use of the Maxim (in its Latin form) in cases
involving the following 34 subject matters: acknowledgements; administrative law;
agency; banks; bills and notes; charities; chattel mortgages; collective bargaining agree-
ments; constitutional law (federal and state); contracts; corporate reorganization; execu-
tors and administrators; future interests; guaranty and suretyship; infants; injunctions;
insurance; intoxicating liquors; judgments; labor law; land patents (grants); mechanics'
liens; motor vehicles; municipal corporations; patents; public contracts; replevin; re-
straint of trade; schools; statutes; supersedeas; trusts; vendor and purchaser; wills.
16. See, e.g., G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 147 (6th ed. 1987); 2 J.W. PERRY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) §§ 687, 723.
17. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14-15 (1958).
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In 1985, the Court followed the same line of thought in
overruling National League of Cities v. Usery,18 where the Court
had held that state and local governments enjoy a tenth amend-
ment immunity from federal wage and hour regulation under the
commerce clause. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 9 the Court said:
The central theme of National League of Cities was that the
States occupy a special position in our constitutional system and
that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause
must reflect that position. Of course, the Commerce Clause by its
specific language does not provide any special limitation on Con-
gress' actions with respect to the States. [Citation] It is equally
true, however, that the text of the Constitution provides the be-
ginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into ques-
tions of federalism, for "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional
provisions are postulates which limit and control."20
The Maxim has long been part and parcel of constitutional
interpretation. In the context of judicial review, this Article will
call it "the necessity principle." When is it necessary for the
Court to devise a new constitutional rule, and when not?
Broadly speaking, it is necessary when it is the only way to head
off disaffection that is likely to result in lawless self-help on the
part of people who despair of obtaining fair consideration of
their needs and opinions through the political process. Such de-
spair may arise from restriction of the voting franchise or other
official interference with the political process. It may also be felt
by members of discrete and insular minorities who have reason
to consider themselves victims of official discrimination or neg-
lect. On the other hand, the necessity principle does not justify
the Court in making a new constitutional rule to deal with a
problem that can fairly be resolved through the political process.
This limitation is important. It is the reason voters continue
to respect judicial review as a legitimate aspect of self-govern-
ment, and do not use their power (through their elected repre-
18. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
19. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
20. Id. at 547 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)) (noncon-
senting state is immune from suit by foreign sovereign).
1987]
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sentatives) to curtail it - as they might well do, should they
come to believe that the Court is eroding their power of self-
government by invalidating official action without regard to the
necessity principle.2
III. Disregard of the Necessity Principle
For the last 25 years or so, the Supreme Court has been in-
troducing constitutional innovations at an ever-increasing rate.
A number of its decisions cannot be justified under the necessity
principle. No one of them, by itself, is enough to jeopardize self-
government. Taken together, however, they betoken progressive
erosion of popular sovereignty.
One such innovation was Cohen v. California.22 Paul Robert
Cohen was held to be constitutionally protected from punish-
ment for strolling back and forth in a county courthouse wearing
a jacket on the back of which was the painted admonition "Fuck
the Draft." He was convicted under a statute prohibiting distur-
bance of the peace by "offensive conduct,"23 the state court find-
ing his language to be offensive because it fell below the "mini-
mum standard of propriety and the accepted norm of public
behavior." 24 The Supreme Court reversed,25 emphasizing the
fact that Cohen's words expressed his opinion on a political is-
sue; and that was certainly pertinent. The Court apparently gave
no weight, however, to the likelihood that Cohen's expletive
would offend passers-by without adding to the substance of his
message.
The Court had decided long before, in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,26 that freedom to express one's opinion does not in-
clude the right to express it in a manner hurtful to others.
"[W]ords . . . which by their very utterance inflict injury," the
Court said, "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and
are not protected by the Constitution.2 7 Chaplinsky had called a
peace officer a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fas-
21. See L. LUSKY, supra note 1, at 29-30, 39-41.
22. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
23. Id. at 16.
24. People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969).
25. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
26. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
27. Id. at 572.
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cist," and the Court upheld his conviction for addressing "an of-
fensive, derisive, or annoying word" to another in a public place.
In the Cohen case, however, the Court overrode a state court
finding2 8 that the expletive was likely to provoke violent removal
of the jacket by onlookers to protect the sensibilities of women
and children who were present. The question in both cases was
whether a state can insist on minimum standards of civility in
political discourse. The Chaplinsky case held yes. The Cohen
case, in effect, held no. And the Court's opinion in the Cohen
case did not explain how the necessity principle justified the ex-
tension of constitutional protection to scatological expression.
Another constitutional innovation took place in Buckley v.
Valeo, 9 which invalidated a portion of the Federal Election
Campaign Act,30 as amended in 1974 (after Watergate). In that
statute, Congress had made the judgment that campaign contri-
butions and expenditures in federal elections should be limited
in order to avoid corruption and the appearance of corruption.
Contributions to candidates and expenditures for candidates
both have the same ultimate purpose, and both can result in cor-
rupt practices. The Court held, however, that although Congress
can limit contributions," it lacks power to limit expenditures. 32
The Court treated spending to support a candidate as if it were
a political statement on his behalf,33 overlooking the fact that
although money is sometimes spent for publicizing the spender's
views, it is often used to defray other campaign expenses. 4 It
thus held, in effect, that the first amendment protects more than
communication.
The necessity principle would have justified invalidation of
provisions giving incumbents an advantage over their challeng-
ers. Fair treatment of challengers tends to restore public faith in
the political process; and that faith can perhaps be more com-
28. 403 U.S. at 20.
29. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
30. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263.
31. 424 U.S. at 23-38.
32. Id. at 39-59.
33. Id. at 39: "It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to
restrict the quantity of campaign speech .
34. Id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting).
19871
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pletely restored if the Court, rather than Congress itself, decides
whether challengers are receiving fair treatment. The Buckley
decision, however, went further. It disapproved a sensible at-
tempt by Congress to keep big spenders from evading the contri-
bution limitations.3 5 The Court did not explain how the neces-
sity principle justified this extension of first amendment
coverage.
Another constitutional innovation was made in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc.," where the Court repudiated the "commercial speech"
doctrine of Valentine v. Chrestensen.37 In the Valentine case,
the Court had denied constitutional protection to a commercial
handbill advertisement, evidently reasoning that expression
which merely leads to or makes or accompanies a bargain is de-
void of political significance. In the Virginia Board of Pharmacy
case, the Court brushed aside that important limitation on its
authority. Holding invalid, as an infringement of press freedom,
a state statute that penalized the advertising of prescription
drug prices, the Court used language that Justice Peckham in
1905 might well have employed in Lochner v. New York,38 the
now-discredited leading case on substantive due process:
Here ... the question whether there is a First Amendment
exception for "commercial speech" is squarely before us. Our
pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural,
philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any particu-
larly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even
about commercial matters. The "idea" he wishes to communicate
is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y
price." Our question, then, is whether this communication is
wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
35. Id. at 44; cf. id. at 260-61 (White, J., dissenting).
36. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
37. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
38. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelli-
gent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable. [Citations] And if it is indispensable
to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it
is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to
how the system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even
if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instru-
ment to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we
could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal.39
The last two quoted sentences seem to assume that Virgini-
ans who disapproved the restriction on advertising could not
seek remedial action through the state legislature, or that the
legislature was incapable of informing itself on the large price
variations sheltered by the existing law. The Court did not ex-
plain these assumptions; but unless they are well-founded, the
necessity principle does not justify the decision.
A cognate development, the "corporate speech" doctrine,
was inaugurated in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.4 0
A Massachusetts criminal law, based on the idea that corporate
intervention in politics tends to result in corruption or apparent
corruption, forbade corporations to spend money lobbying on
public issues not materially affecting their business or assets.
The Court held the statute unconstitutional.
There was no interference with individual expression by the
bank's stockholders, directors, officers, or employees. The stat-
ute did no more than say that an artificial entity, created for a
non-political purpose, was not to be used by its managers for an
activity foreign to the purposes for which it was created. Politi-
cally significant speech is important because it helps the voters
to control their government. If individuals want to form a corpo-
ration or other organization to promote their political views, the
Constitution rightly protects their ability to do so."' But corpo-
rations do not vote. Even if, as some have maintained,2 there is
39. 425 U.S. at 760-61, 765 (footnotes omitted).
40. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
41. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (state-compelled disclo-
sure of membership lists of nonprofit political organization held unconstitutional).
42. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
19871
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a basis for protecting freedom of expression in the interest of
individual self-fulfillment - the pursuit of happiness - the
conclusion is the same. Happiness and sadness do not belong to
corporations. The decision is not justified by the necessity prin-
ciple and is an excessive use of judicial review.
Elrod v. Burns43 and Branti v. Finkel" accomplished an-
other constitutional innovation. They extended the Court's
power in a different direction by giving new and broader scope
to the freedom of association. These injunction suits were
brought by three process servers and a security guard/bailiff in
one case, and by two county assistant public defenders in the
other. Their positions were not covered by the civil service sys-
tem, but were left open to party patronage. Nevertheless, the
Court held that incoming Democrats could not replace incum-
bent Republicans who had obtained their positions under the
previous administrations without demonstrating "that party af-
filiation is an appropriate requirement for the effective perform-
ance of the public office involved. '4 5
Justice Powell, dissenting in both cases, urged that the
party patronage system possesses merits (including the merit of
keeping the voters in control of bureaucrats as well as elected
officials) that can reasonably be thought to outweigh the advan-
tages of the civil service system.46 He saw no reason why the line
between civil service and patronage jobs should not continue to
be settled by legislation, as a policy matter.47 "In my view," he
said, "the First Amendment does not incorporate a national civil
service system."4 8
The Court, however, asserted power to decide which jobs
can be filled by patronage. The reason it gave was that the in-
cumbent employees' freedom of political association was at
stake. The Court seems to have overlooked the interest of the
ring) (upholding a state court conviction under a California statute prohibiting criminal
syndicalism): "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties .... They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness .. .
. 43. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
44. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
45. Id. at 518.
46. Id. at 529-30, 532.
47. Id. at 533.
48. Id. at 534.
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voters in installing a government that their own associational
freedom had enabled them to elect. The decision subordinates
that interest to the narrower interest of public employees, with-
out explaining how the necessity principle justifies such a result.
In 1964, the Court held for the first time that first amend-
ment protection extends to libelous expression. Until then it had
taken the position that libelous utterances are not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech."9 A new rule was an-
nounced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:50 that defamatory
statements about public officials, relating to their official con-
duct, are not actionable unless they are knowingly or recklessly
false.
The necessity principle supports this constitutional innova-
tion. The Times had suffered a $500,000 judgment for slight in-
accuracies in a civil rights advertisement criticizing the perform-
ance of the Montgomery, Alabama, police."' The Alabama courts
had applied the common law of libel, which is heavily weighted
in favor of plaintiffs: liability can be imposed without proof of
negligence or other fault, the defendant has the burden of prov-
ing truth, and the jury can award large compensatory, as well as
punitive, damages without proof of monetary loss.52 These rules
establish a standard of accuracy higher than the news media can
achieve,53 operating as they do with the tight deadlines that
competition forces upon them. The large Sullivan judgment
gave notice that press coverage of the civil rights movement in
the deep South would be an extra-hazardous activity. If that
judgment stood, the full picture of racial discrimination might
never have been brought home to the electorate throughout the
country. The news reports were politically significant expression,
fueling the eventually successful drive for remedial legislation
addressed to the needs of the discrete and insular black
minority.54
49. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256, 266 (1952).
50. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51. Id. at 257-59.
52. Id. at 267.
53. Id. at 271.
54. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
284, 82 Stat. 73.
1987]
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Building on the Sullivan precedent, however, the Court has
proceeded to federalize a substantial but poorly defined portion
of the complex field of libel law. It seems to be functioning as a
common law court, revising state libel law by developing new
rules on a case-by-case basis. For example, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,55 the Court held that even in a suit brought by a
private figure, liability for defamatory falsehood cannot be im-
posed without proof of negligence or other fault," and punitive
damages cannot be awarded.17 And in Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps," another "private figure" case, the Court
held that the defendant cannot be assigned the burden of proof
on the issue of truth or falsity, at least if the defendant is a
newspaper" and if the speech at issue is "of public concern. '" 60
The Court has not explained how the necessity principle justifies
such intrusion into state tort law.
In equal protection cases, the outcome often depends on
whether the Court exercises "heightened scrutiny." If so, a legis-
lative classification will be upheld only if the Court is satisfied
that it serves an important purpose in an acceptable way. In
other words, heightened scrutiny results in a presumption of in-
validity - a heavy one in "strict scrutiny" cases, a somewhat
lighter one in "intermediate scrutiny" cases.61 Both types of
heightened scrutiny, however, involve judicial reexamination of
the wisdom of the legislative action.
The necessity principle may well call for such reexamination
where there is discrimination against such groups as blacks or
women, who have reason to doubt that legislatures take their
needs and opinions seriously. Judicial review helps convince
them that they have received fair treatment, and sustains their
faith in the political process. The Court, however, has also exer-
cised heightened scrutiny where discrimination has favored
blacks and women.
55. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
56. Id. at 347.
57. Id. at 350.
58. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
59. Id. at 1565 n.4.
60. Id. at 1564.
61. For a discussion of heightened scrutiny, see GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 588-
91 (11th ed. 1985).
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One such case is Craig v. Boren.62 An Oklahoma statute pro-
hibited the sale of 3.2% beer to men under the age of 21, while
allowing such sale to women aged 18 or more. The Court applied
intermediate scrutiny, declaring that "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives."" The
statute was held invalid. Statistics adduced by the state indi-
cated that young men have more auto accidents than young
women, are arrested far more often for drunk driving, and, when
on a date, usually do the driving."' The Court gave reasons why
the statistics did not impress it, but did not deny that they
might reasonably have impressed the state legislature - nor did
the Court explain why that should not be enough. That is to say,
it did not explain why the political process could not be counted
on to deal satisfactorily with complaints of unfair discrimination
against men.
Similarly, a majority of the Justices applied heightened
scrutiny in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,65
the leading affirmative action case. Strict scrutiny was favored
by Justice Powell,66 and intermediate scrutiny by four of his col-
leagues.6 7 The case involved a preference for nonwhites in ad-
mission to a state medical school, pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tion plan.
The wisdom of affirmative action depends on circumstances
of time and place. On the one hand, it may be the only practical
way to mitigate the continuing effect of past discrimination."
On the other hand, it has the unwanted side effect of postponing
the day when skin color will have no more significance than hair
color or eye color, since it uses skin color as a determinant of
legal rights. Legislatures, being in closer touch with community
conditions than courts, are better equipped to balance the op-
62. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
63. Id. at 197.
64. Id. at 200-03.
65. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
66. Id. at 290-91.
67. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
68. Id. at 341-45 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
69. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part) ("[Elven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of as-
signment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness ....").
1987]
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posing considerations and decide whether affirmative action is
desirable, and in what form, and for how long. The necessity
principle would not seem to call for heightened scrutiny, since
the political process is available to whites complaining against
the discrimination.
Intermediate scrutiny was deemed applicable in Plyler v.
Doe,7 0 which held that Texas is constitutionally obligated to pro-
vide illegal aliens with free public school education. As the Court
pointed out, there was indeed a danger that the illegal alien chil-
dren would grow up to form a permanent underclass if left uned-
ucated, adding to problems of unemployment, welfare, and
crime. 1 Moreover, the children were not morally responsible for
the unlawful immigration of the parents who had brought them
across the border.7 ' The Court failed to explain, however, why
the Texas electorate could not be counted on to do what is best
for Texans, including educating illegal alien children if that is
necessary to avoid problems associated with a large underclass.
IV. Conclusion
Only the Court can keep judicial review within principled
limits. This Article has proposed that it be used only for en-
forcement of rules contained in the constitutional text or im-
plied by its structure, or devised by the Court to fulfill basic
national commitments. This Author does not insist on this par-
ticular limit; perhaps someone else can offer a more useful one.
Unless the Court respects some limit, however, judicial review
will lose its effectiveness even in the two areas where the Court
can do a better job than elected officials: protection of self-gov-
ernment and preservation of the open society. Those are the ar-
eas where judicial review is uniquely valuable.
The cases reviewed above indicate that the Court has ceased
to observe any limit on its power to invalidate statutes or other
official action if a majority of the Justices believe they know a
better way - even though any defects are correctible through
the political process. The consequence may be to convert judicial
review into a wasting asset.
70. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
71. Id. at 218-19, 230.
72. Id. at 220.
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